**Re-conceptualizing Resistance Organizations and Outcomes:**

**Introducing the Revolutionary and Militant Organizations Dataset (REVMOD)**

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**ONLINE APPENDIX**

Table A: Comparison to Other Datasets

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **STUDY/DATASET** | ***n*** | **UNIT OF ANALYSIS** | **NUMBER OF VARIABLES** | **DATA TYPE** | **SCOPE OF RESISTANCE ORG. TYPOLOGY** | **TIMEFRAME** |
| REVMOD | 536  | organizations | 48 (annually);60 (static) | Aggregated/Annual Data Points | insurgent, rebel, terrorist, guerrilla, vigilante, nonviolent action, militant political party | 1940-2014 |
| Chenoweth & Lewis (2013): NAVCO 2.0[[1]](#footnote-1) | 250  | organizations/movements | 47 | Annual Data Points | insurgent, terrorist, nonviolent action | 1945-2006 |
| Themnér & Wallensteen (2014): UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset[[2]](#footnote-2) | 552  | inter- and intra-state conflicts | 24 | Annual Data Points | state, insurgent, rebel, terrorist, guerrilla | 1946-2013 |
| Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan (2013): NSA dataset[[3]](#footnote-3) | 271 | inter- and intra-state conflicts | 40 | Annual Data Points | insurgent, rebel, terrorist, guerrilla | 1945-2011 |
| Wilkenfeld, Asal & Pate: MAROB (2008) | 112 | organizations(Middle Eastern only) | 70 | Annual Data Points | Middle Eastern insurgent, rebel, terrorist, guerrilla, nonviolent action, militant political party, political party | 1980-2004 |
| Cunningham (2011) | 73  | self-determination movements | 20 | Annual Data Points | insurgent, rebel, nonviolent action, militant political party | 1960-2003 |
| Lyall & Wilson (2009): Rage | 286  | campaigns | 28 | Aggregated | insurgent, rebel, terrorist | 1800-2005 |
| Cronin (2009) | 457  | organizations | 4 | Aggregated | insurgent, terrorist | 1968-2006 |
| Sullivan (2012) | 508  | inter- and intra-state conflicts | 25 | Aggregated | state, insurgent, rebel, guerilla | 1919-2001 |
| Abrahms (2012) | 117  | campaigns | 12 | Aggregated | terrorist, guerrilla | unspecified |
| Arreguín-Toft (2001) | 197  | asymmetric conflicts | 2 | Aggregated | insurgent, rebel, guerrilla, weak state | 1800-1998 |
| Jones & Libicki (2008) | 648  | organizations | 5 | Aggregated | terrorist | 1968-2006 |
| Doyle & Sambanis (2000)[[4]](#footnote-4) | 122 | intra-state conflicts | 24 | Aggregated | insurgent, rebel, guerrilla | 1944-1997 |
| Boot (2013): Invisible Armies Database | 444  | campaigns | 3 | Aggregated | insurgent, rebel, terrorist | 1775-present |

*Explanations of Tables B and C*

Table B: List of Organizations Collected for Potential Inclusion

Table C: List of Organizations Included in the Dataset

See Table B in the Excel file labeled as such. From the list in Table B, organizations were selected for inclusion in the dataset in a multiple-step process. The first step involved documenting all potential organizations that fit the aforementioned definition of resistance organizations (operative sometime between 1940 and 2014). I then investigated the names of resistance organizations to document whether they were original or aliases. After matching aliases to their organizations, the list numbered a *universe* of 2,322 organizations. Simultaneously, I documented resistance organizations that had confirmed operations—either attacks, co-sponsored attacks, demonstrations, or protests. The next step involved removing organizations from the list that lacked confirmed operations (i.e. those documented in either a scholarly or journalistic source). After this elimination process, it left a *near universe* of 1,604 organizations. In final step, organizations were selected for inclusion in the dataset randomly. For the random ordering process and selection, I executed Excel’s command [=rand(); enter; edit-fill-down; paste special values; sort by random: smallest to largest values)].[[5]](#footnote-5) For organizations included in the dataset, see Table C in the Excel file labeled as such. Table C lists the organizations dynamically, showing their nominal changes over time.

Table D: Descriptions and Summary Statistics for Static Data

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | *n* | Minimum  | Maximum | Mean | Standard Deviation | Short Descriptions(SEE CODEBOOK BELOW FOR DETAILED DEFINITIONS) |
| *ORGANIZATION* | *536* |  |  |  |  | I selected organizations at random from an extensive list of the universe (or near universe) of known resistance organizations operative during the time period of 1940-2014 |
| IDENTITY GROUP/CONSTITUENCY  | *536* |  |  |  |  | Identifies the core constituent identity group of each organization |
| AREA OF OPERATION |  |  |  |  |  | Identifies the areas in which an organization operates |
| OUTCOME GOAL | *536* |  |  |  |  | Identifies the core outcome goal of each organization |
| SEPARATION | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if primarily pursues a separatist outcome goal; 0 if not |
| OVERTHROW/TAKEOVER | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if primarily pursues an outcome goal to overthrow the target; 0 if not |
| EXPEL/ELIMINATE | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if primarily pursues an outcome goal to expel the target; 0 if not |
| EMPIRE | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if primarily pursues an outcome goal of establishing political control over multiple current states; 0 if not |
| COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if primarily pursues a counter-revolutionary outcome goal; 0 if not |
| REFORM | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if primarily pursues a reformist outcome goal; 0 if not |
| ANTI-SYSTEM | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if primarily subscribes to an anti-system outcome goal; 0 if not |
| ACHIEVEMENT | 536 | 0 | 20 | 5.13 | 6.53 | Scores organizational achievement on a continuous scale  |
| COMPLETE SUCCESS | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if organization achieved its outcome completely; 0 if not |
| PARTIAL SUCCESS | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if organization achieved its outcome partially; 0 if not |
| POLITICAL COMMAND  | 536 | 0 | 20 | 5.32 | 6.13 | Scores organizational political command and control infrastructure on a continuous scale |
| POLITICAL COMMAND (binary) | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if organization has an embedded political command; 0 if not |
| STRICTLY VIOLENT | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | Identifies whether an organization only employs violent means in the pursuit of its outcome goal |
| STRICTLY NONVIOLENT | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | Identifies whether an organization only employs nonviolent means in the pursuit of its outcome goal |
| MIXED APPROACH | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | Identifies whether an organization employs both violent and nonviolent means in the pursuit of its outcome goal |
| AGE | 536 | 0.1 | 148 | 17.44 | 20.33 | The variable tracks the age of an organization |
| CONFLICT DURATION | 536 | 0.1 | 148 | 14.45 | 16.32 | The variable tracks the duration of conflict between an organization and its adversary |
| SIZE (Logged) | 536 | 2.3 | 16.38 | 7.45 | 3.66 | The log of the peak number of an organization’s membership |
| STATE SPONSORS | 536 | 0 | 9 | 0.62 | 1.16 | The number of an organization’s state sponsors |
| SPONSOR FIGHTS | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if a state sponsor has fought alongside an organization; 0 if not |
| LOST STATE SPONSOR | 420 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if a state sponsor stopped supporting an organization; 0 if not |
| NETWORK TIES | 536 | 0 | 48 | 2.53 | 4.14 | The number of an organization’s network ties to fellow non-state organizations |
| TIE FIGHTS | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if a network tie has fought alongside an organization; 0 if not |
| SAFE HAVENS | 536 | 0 | 3 | 0.18 | 0.47 | The number of an organization’s safe havens |
| IDEOLOGY | *536* |  |  |  |  | Identifies the core ideology of each organization |
| *POLITICAL ISLAM* | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if primarily subscribes to an Islamist ideology; 0 if not |
| *LEFTIST* | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if primarily subscribes to a leftist ideology; 0 if not |
| *RIGHTWING* | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if primarily subscribes to a rightwing ideology; 0 if not |
| *NATIONALIST* | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if primarily subscribes to a nationalist ideology; 0 if not |
| *ANARCHIST* | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if primarily subscribes to an anarchist ideology; 0 if not |
| CIVIL WAR | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if engaged in a civil war; 0 if not |
| TERRORISM | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if an organization targets civilians and/or non-combatants with acts of violence; 0 if not |
| NUMBER OF ATTACKS | 536 | 0 | 4518 | 126.57 | 434.96 | The variable tracks the number of attacks an organization has conducted |
| NUMBER OF KILLS | 536 | 0 | 15000 | 314.8 | 1346.8 | The variable tracks the number of kills an organization has inflicted with its attacks |
| LETHALITY | 536 | 0 | 73.25 | 3.12 | 7.02 | The variable calculates an organizations lethality by dividing the organization’s total number of inflicted kills by its total number of attacks |
| NUMBER OFSUICIDE ATTACKS | 536 | 0 | 1263 | 6.91 | 65.79 | The variable tracks the number of suicide attacks an organization has conducted |
| NUMBER OF DEMONSTRATIONS/PROTESTS (Liberal Estimate) | 531 | 0 | 338 | 1.85 | 15.12 | The variable liberally documents the number of demonstrations or protests an organization has participated in  |
| NUMBER OF DEMONSTRATIONS/PROTESTS (Conservative Estimate) | 536 | 0 | 300 | 1.36 | 13.22 | The variable conservatively documents the number of demonstrations or protests an organization has participated in |
| NUMBER OF DEMONSTRATIONS TURNED VIOLENT | 536 | 0 | 10 | 0.23 | 0.85 | The variable tracks the number of demonstrations or protests an organization has participated in that turned violent |
| ADVERSARIES | *536* |  |  |  |  |  |
| ADVERSARY POLITY | 536 | 0 | 20 | 11.70 | 8.03 | Polity IV score of the primary adversary (I adjusted the -10 to 10 scale to a fully positive scale) |
| STATE ADVERSARY | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if primarily fighting a state; 0 if not |
| DEMOCRATIC ADVERSARY | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if primarily fighting a democratic state; 0 if not |
| ADVERSARY GDP PER CAPITA | 536 | 0 | 83383 | 8609 | 13940 | GDP per capita of the primary adversary |
| LEADER/S | *536* |  |  |  |  |  |
| LEADERSHIPDECAPITATION | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if adversary assassinated or arrested the organization’s top leader; 0 if not |
| LEADER KILLED | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | if adversary assassinated the organization’s top leader; 0 if not |
| LEADER ARRESTED | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | if adversary arrested the organization’s top leader; 0 if not |
| LEADER ARRESTED AND EXECUTED | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | if adversary arrested and subsequently executed the organization’s top leader; 0 if not |
| HEGEMONIC | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if an organization marks the largest entity pursuing a specific outcome goal; 0 if not |
| UNIFIED FRONT | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if an organization signifies an alliance of all groups seeking a particular outcome goal; 0 if not |
| TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC PARTY POLITICS | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if an organization has participated in democratic party politics and elections; 0 if not |
| WESTERN WORLD | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if an organization operates primarily from the West; 0 if not |
| LATIN AMERICA | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if an organization operates primarily from the Latin America; 0 if not |
| MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if an organization operates primarily from the Middle East and North Africa; 0 if not |
| SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if an organization operates primarily from Sub-Saharan Africa; 0 if not |
| CENTRAL/EURASIA | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if an organization operates primarily from Central/Eurasia; 0 if not |
| SOUTH ASIA | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if an organization operates primarily from South Asia; 0 if not |
| SOUTHEAST ASIA | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if an organization operates primarily from Southeast Asia; 0 if not |
| EAST ASIA | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if an organization operates primarily from East Asia; 0 if not |
| EXCLUDED IDENTITY GROUP | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if an organization represents an identity group formally excluded in the target state’s politically system; 0 if not |
| TRANSITIONED TO ORGANIZED CRIME | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if an organization has transitioned to criminal (non-political) enterprises; 0 if not |
| TRANSITIONED FROM ORGANIZED CRIME TO RESISTANCE | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if an organization transitioned from criminal (non-political) enterprises to political resistance; 0 if not |
| DRUG TRADE | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if an organization operates in the drug trade; 0 if not |
| FIGHTS FOREIGN FORCE | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if an organization primarily fights a foreign force; 0 if not |
| PARTICIPATES IN NEGOTIATIONS | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if an organization has participated in negotiations with its primary adversary; 0 if not |
| SPLINTER ORGANIZATION | 536 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 1 if an organization emerged as a splinter organization; 0 if not |

*Robustness Checks*

 Table E presents additional Prais-Winsten analyses. Model A replaces the anti-system binary variable for more specific outcome-goal variables. Model B adds measures of resistance activity: number of attacks, number of inflicted kills, and number of nonviolent demonstrations. Model C combines both additions. In all three models, the main results from the article hold.

Table E: Prais-Winsten Regression Results (Continued)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **y=Achievement** | Model A | Model B | Model C |
| Political Command | 0.417\*\*\* | 0.351\*\*\* | 0.356\*\*\* |
|  | (0.030) | (0.036) | (0.036) |
| Achievement *t*-1 | 0.041 | 0.142\*\*\* | 0.130\*\*\* |
|  | (0.022) | (0.024) | (0.158) |
| Mixed Approach | -0.012 | -0.207 | -0.190 |
|  | (0.147) | (0.154) | (0.158) |
| Only Nonviolent | -1.714\*\*\* | -2.098\*\*\* | -2.081\*\*\* |
|  | (0.175) | (0.211) | (0.215) |
| Number of Attacks |  | 0.003\*\*\* | 0.003\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Number of Kills |  | -0.00003 | -0.00003 |
|  |  | (0.00003) | (0.00003) |
| Number of Demonstrations  |  | 0.035 | 0.034 |
| (liberal estimate) |  | (0.077) | (0.079) |
| Conflict Duration  | -0.016\*\*\* | -0.020\*\*\* | -0.020\*\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| Size (logged) | 0.243\*\*\* | 0.153\*\*\* | 0.151\*\*\* |
|  | (0.038) | (0.039) | (0.040) |
| Anti-System |  | 0.113 |  |
|  |  | (0.209) |  |
| Separate | 0.163 |  | 0.005 |
|  | (0.250) |  | (0.221) |
| Overthrow | -0.242 |  | -0.222 |
|  | (0.280) |  | (0.252) |
| Expel | -0.039 |  | -0.380 |
|  | (0.436) |  | (0.410) |
| Reform | -0.445 |  | -0.320 |
|  | (0.380) |  | (0.345) |
| Counter Revolution | 0.827 |  | 0.469 |
|  | (0.480) |  | (0.452) |
| Adversary Polity | -0.010 | -0.010 | -0.008 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| Constant | 2.852\*\*\* | 2.852\*\*\* | 3.084\*\*\* |
|  | (0.297) | (0.297) | (0.291) |
| Observations | 5189 | 3723 | 3723 |
| R2 | 0.37 | 0.45 | 0.44 |
| F-Statistic |  50.28\*\*\* |  42.28\*\*\* | 30.62\*\*\* |
| Root MSE | 1.48 | 1.35 | 1.34 |
| ρ | 0.85 | 0.83 | 0.86 |
| Coefficients with semi-robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\*p<0.001, \*\*p<0.01, \*p<0.05 |

 Table F displays the results of pooled logistic regression models that test alternative measures of outcome-goal success and a binary measure of political command.[[6]](#footnote-6) Model D tests a binary measure of partial outcome-goal achievement (the equivalent of a score of 10+ in the graduated measure). Model E tests a binary measure of complete outcome-goal achievement. Model F is an ordered logit that tests the combined measures of complete success, partial success, and no success. As with the models in Table 4 in the main text, the logit models reveal political command as the most reliable predictor of resistance success.

Table F: Pooled Logistic Regression Results

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **y=Achieved Outcome Goal (Binary Measures)** | Model D:*Including Partial Success* | Model E:*Only Complete Success* | Model F:*Ordered Success* |
| Political Command (Binary) | 1.467\*\*\* | 2.190\*\*\* | 1.485\*\*\* |
|  | (0.286) | (0.512) | (0.281) |
| Mixed Approach | 0.653 | 0.815 | 0.651 |
|  | (0.388) | (0.549) | (0.380) |
| Only Nonviolent | -0.484 | 0.348 | -0.474 |
|  | (0.437) | (0.549) | (0.433) |
| Conflict Duration  | 0.002 | -0.025 | -0.0002 |
|  | (0.007) | (0.021) | (0.007) |
| Size (logged) | 0.195\*\* | 0.113 | 0.197\*\* |
|  | (0.067) | (0.086) | (0.068) |
| Anti-System | -0.329 | -0.707 | -0.376 |
|  | (0.342) | (0.403) | (0.314) |
| Adversary Polity | -0.031\* | -0.063\*\* | -0.035\* |
|  | (0.015) | (0.020) | (0.014) |
| Constant | -3.869\*\*\* | -4.961\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.556) | (1.134) |  |
| Cut 1 |  |  | 3.799 |
|  |  |  | (0.607) |
| Cut 2 |  |  | 5.673 |
|  |  |  | (0.713) |
| Observations  | 5607 | 5607 | 5607 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.24 | 0.27 | 0.21 |
| Wald chi2 | 87.08\*\*\* | 60.63\*\*\* | 87.38\*\*\* |
| Log pseudolikelihood | -1503.75 | -479.05 | -1824.55 |
| Correctly Classified | 88.71% | 97.49% |  |
| Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\*p<0.001, \*\*p<0.01, \*p<0.05 |

*Testing the Inclusion of Former Resistance Organizations that Transitioned to Legal Parties*

 To test how illegality may affect the likelihood of nonviolent organizations achieving their political outcomes, I coded achievement scores in REVMOD’s dynamic dataset for time periods when former nonviolent resistance organizations became completely legal. For example, I coded the success levels of such nonviolent organizations as the Union of Democratic Forces in Bulgaria, Sajūdis in Lithuania, and Demos in Slovenia into their phases as legal nonviolent organizations. Table G displays the results of three additional time-series models that include these additional organization-years.

Table G: Prais-Winsten Regression Results (Continued)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **y=Achievement** | Model G | Model H*Nonviolent Organizations* | Model I |
| Political Command | 0.415\*\*\* | 0.505\*\*\* | 0.417\*\*\* |
|  | (0.027) | (0.056) | (0.030) |
| Achievement *t*-1 |  |  | 0.047\* |
|  |  |  | (0.024) |
| Mixed Approach | -0.055 |  | -0.035 |
|  | (0.146) |  | (0.144) |
| Only Nonviolent | -1.845\*\*\* |  | -1.784\*\*\* |
|  | (0.182) |  | (0.175) |
| Conflict Duration  | -0.017\*\*\* | -0.018 | -0.016\*\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.011) | (0.004) |
| Size (logged) | 0.274\*\*\* | 0.246\*\* | 0.236\*\*\* |
|  | (0.040) | (0.090) | (0.038) |
| Anti-System | 0.215 | 1.832\*\* | -0.078 |
|  | (0.261) | (0.570) | (0.256) |
| Adversary Polity | -0.005 | -0.017 | -0.008 |
|  | (0.006) | (0.021) | (0.006) |
| Constant | 1.940\*\*\* | -1.476 | 2.059\*\*\* |
|  | (0.288) | (0.927) | (0.326) |
| Observations | 5653 | 948 | 5218 |
| R2 | 0.34 | 0.36 | 0.36 |
| F-Statistic |  87.97\*\*\* | 23.55\*\*\* | 75.37\*\*\* |
| Root MSE | 1.69 | 2.13 | 1.54 |
| ρ | 0.83 | 0.86 | 0.85 |
| Coefficients with semi-robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\*p<0.001, \*\*p<0.01, \*p<0.05 |

The robustness checks show that even when capturing the years where nonviolent resistance organizations become completely legal (often as institutionalized political parties), degree of political command remains the greatest predictor of organizational success; and, nonviolent resistance organizations remain comparatively disadvantaged—still producing a statistically significant, substantive, and negative effect on outcome-goal achievement. Notably, this is only a preliminary analysis and future large-*n* studies should thoroughly compare the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance organizations to interest groups and legal opposition political parties in order to fully gauge how illegality may affect nonviolent resistance organizations.

*Inter-Coder Reliability Exercise*

Inter-coder, or inter-rater, reliability refers to the degree of agreement in specific data entries coded by more than one individual.[[7]](#footnote-7) As Gwet notes: “inter-rater reliability is concerned about the reproducibility of measurements by different raters… (2014, 6).” Often data suffers from multiple-coder bias, where various researchers code the same variable differently for different or the same observations. Salehyan (2015, 107-108) notes:

Whenever possible, researchers should also check the validity of the coding procedure by computing intercoder reliability statistics [e.g. Cohen’s Kappa]… rarely do research projects report such statistics. Often it is unfeasible to double-code all data points and variables of interest. Yet researchers can randomly sample a percentage of cases for double-coding in order to refine and improve the coding procedure as well as aid in the training of researchers.

The simplest way to measure agreement between two or more coders is to calculate the percentage of agreed upon data entries among the coders (Osgood 1959). Nevertheless, methodologists early on in the development of ICR studies realized that merely calculating percent agreement ignores the possibility that coders may agree on something by chance. Various agreement coefficients thus emerged with Cohen’s (1960) kappa becoming the standard (Gwet 2014).[[8]](#footnote-8) To fully account for “chance,” Cohen (1960) estimates “the expected percent chance agreement,” as denoted by *pe*. Cohen puts forth his Kappa Coefficient as follows:

$$κ= \frac{Pa-Pe}{1-Pe}$$

In an effort to generalize the Kappa Coefficient, Fleiss (1971) adapted the measure for multiple coders—defining the percent change agreement that any pair of coders could provide the same classification. Gwet (2008) devises AC1 to overcome some mathematical limitations of the Kappa Coefficient.

 In building REVMOD, I personally completed the initial multi-year data collection process. Following the suggestion of reviewer and taking Salehyan’s (2015) procedural advice (as noted above), I randomly selected 50 organization-years and hired three research assistants to each independently re-collect data on eight variables for the 50 organization years. I then calculated ICR statistics for assessing the degree of agreement between the four coding sets (i.e. my original coding and those recently completed by my three research assistants).

Table H below displays the results of the ICR exercise. The table presents the median number of coders for each REVMOD variable recoded, the average number of coders, the percent agreement between the coders, and the three leading ICR measures: Krippendorff’s Alpha, Fleiss’ Kappa Coefficient, and Gwet’s AC1. A standard benchmark for assessing ICR measures are as follows: 0.8000-1.000 indicates an excellent degree of agreement between coders; 0.6000-0.7999 signifies substantial agreement; 0.4000-0.5999 reflects moderate agreement; 0.2000-0.3999 suggests some agreement; and 0.000-0.1999 indicates a poor degree of agreement (Landis & Koch 1977; Klein 2017). Given these benchmarks, the results for each variable bode well for the ICR test. According to the standard measures of ICR studies, REVMOD’s coding rubrics facilitate a high degree of reliability in the data.

Table H: ICR Results

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **REVMOD Variable** | ***n*** | **Average #****of Coders** | **Percent Agreement** | **Krippendorff’s****Alpha** | **Fleiss’****Kappa** | **Gwet’s****AC1** |
| Violent | 45 | 3.29 | 0.9820 | 0.9622 | 0.9639 | 0.9640 |
| Nonviolent | 45 | 3.29 | 0.9730 | 0.9325 | 0.9356 | 0.9534 |
| Mixed Approach | 45 | 3.29 | 0.9550 | 0.8523 | 0.8459 | 0.9363 |
| Political Command | 48 | 3.77 | 0.9481 | 0.8985 | 0.8945 | 0.8981 |
| Partial Success | 47 | 3.81 | 0.9659 | 0.8887 | 0.8922 | 0.9501 |
| Complete Success | 47 | 3.75 | 0.9651 | 0.7103 | 0.7624 | 0.9591 |
| Anti-System Goal | 50 | 3.82 | 0.9694 | 0.9259 | 0.9313 | 0.9448 |
| Leadership Decapitation | 43 | 3.93 | 0.9762 | 0.8216 | 0.8166 | 0.9726 |

*Assessing Coding Validity:*

*A Comparison of Conflict Duration in REVMOD, NSA, NAVCO, and MAROB*

Below I show the differences in the coding of conflict durations for the respective datasets of REVMOD, NSA, NAVCO, and MAROB. Table I displays differences in coding for 15 randomly selected cases from REVMOD. Blank spaces indicate the given dataset does not code for the organization/conflict. As REVMOD and MAROB distinguish between conflict duration and the founding and defunct dates for organizations, both sets of dates are presented for those two datasets.

Many datasets underestimate conflict durations simply because they do not include violence from at least one of the sides. This leads to underestimations of conflict durations, especially for conflicts involving nonviolent resistance organizations. As noted in the main text, the greatest disparity in coding is with NAVCO, which frequently miscodes the onset dates of conflicts. NAVCO’s average duration is 6.9 years compared to REVMOD’s 11.1 years of active resistance. This derives largely from a simple aggregation of miscodings of onset in NAVCO. For example, NAVCO considers the onset of the PKK’s campaign in 1992 even though it began in 1978. At closer inspection, most entries in NAVCO are off by a couple of years. As I note in the main text, this is not the first article to bring attention to serious coding flaws in NAVCO (see also Bayer, Bethke & Lambach 2016; and Acosta & Ramos 2017). MAROB artificially starts the onset of conflicts at 1980 even when conflicts began before 1980 (Wilkenfeld, Asal & Pate 2008). This leads to some significant inaccuracy. As Table I shows, this procedure carves off two years of the PKK’s conflict with Turkey and five years off of al-Mourabitoun’s conflicts with various nonstate actors in Lebanon. NSA relies on the UCDP framework of 25 battle deaths in a calendar year (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan (2013). This leads to some missed years of conflict, such as various years that al-Mourabitoun and the Lebanese Communist Party’s (LCP) fought in the Lebanese Civil War (O’Ballance 1998).

Table I: Coding Comparisons

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **REVMOD** | **NSA** | **NAVCO** | **MAROB** |
| **Organization** | **Founded/****Died** | **Conflict****Duration** | **Founded/****Died** | **Conflict****Duration** | **Founded/****Died** | **Conflict****Duration** | **Founded/****Died** | **Conflict****Duration** |
| Epanastikos Laikos Agonas (ELA) | 1971-1995 | 1971-1995 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diretas Já | 1983-1989 | 1983-1989 |  |  |  | 1984-1985 |  |  |
| Al-Mourabitoun[[9]](#footnote-9) | 1957- | 1958;1975-1988 |  | 1958; 1975-1976;1982-1984 |  |  | 1975- | 1980-1984 |
| People’s Progressive Party (PPP)[[10]](#footnote-10) | 1950- | 1968-1992 |  |  |  | 1990-1992 |  |  |
| Madhesh Rastra Janatantrik Revolutionary (RJR) | 2009-2013 | 2009-2013 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Tehrik-e Taliban | 2006- | 2006- |  | 2008- |  |  |  |  |
|  LCP[[11]](#footnote-11) | 1924- | 1958;1975-2000 |  | 1975-1976;1982-1984 |  | 1975 |  |  |
| Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) | 1976- | 1976-1992;2012- |  | 1977-1992 |  | 1979-1992 |  |  |
| Iraultza | 1982-1988 | 1982-1988 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK)[[12]](#footnote-12) | 1978- | 1978- |  | 1984-2008 |  | 1992-1997 | 1978- | 1980- |
| Baloch Republican Army (BRA) | 2007- | 2007- |  | 2008- |  |  |  |  |
| Bodo Liberation Tigers | 1996-2008 | 1996-2003 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Farem Tot Petar | 1974-1975 | 1974-1975 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Operation Déchoukaj | 1984-1986 | 1984-1986 |  |  |  | 1985-1985 |  |  |
| Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU) | 1963- | 1964-1979 |  | 1973-1976 |  |  |  |  |

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1. See related work: Chenoweth & Stephan (2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. See related work: Gleditsch et al. (2002); Melander, Petersson & Themnér (2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. See related work: Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan (2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See related work: DeRouen & Sobek (2004). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. This list remains intact and when adding organizations to the dataset, I continue down the list for additions. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Employing logit models to analyze binary and ordered measures of success follows previous research (Lyall & Wilson 2009; Chenoweth & Stephan 2011; Cunningham 2011; Abrahms 2012; Chenoweth & Schock 2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. The esoteric distinction between “rater” and “coder” derives from “coders” using codebooks to guide them in the rating of data entries (Scott 1955). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Krippendorff’s alpha (1980), which is nearly identical to Scott’s (1955) pi, can account for more than two coders but necessarily drops observations or subjects coded by only one coder from the calculation. This loses the nuance of assessing how some coders may find appropriate sources to code a data entry where other coders leave the same entry as “missing data.” [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. NSA groups al-Mourabitoun in with the Lebanese National Movement (LNM). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. NAVCO groups the PPP in with the Guyanese Anti-Burnham/Hoyte campaign. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. NSA groups the LCP in with the LNM. NAVCO brands the LCP as “Lebanon Leftists.” [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. NAVCO refers to the PKK as “Kurdish Rebellion.” [↑](#footnote-ref-12)